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THE POWER BEHIND THE PROMISE:
ENFORCING NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND
TO IMPROVE EDUCATION
Abstract: Despite the U.S. Supreme Court's recognition in 1954, in Brown
v. Board of Education, that education is of paramount importance, six
million middle and high school students are still in danger of being left
behind. Less than seventy-five percent of eighth graders, fifty percent in
urban schools, are graduating from high school within five years. Advo-
cates for educational equity have appealed to the courts, achieving
limited success. They have also turned to the legislature, which most re-
cently enacted the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 ("NCLB"). Thus far,
however, the federal government has not enforced NCLB adequately.
This Note argues that to protect the benefits NCLB confers upon them,
parents of children attending failing schools must explore their options
for private enforcement. Given the Court's decisions within the past three
years narrowing implied private right of action and § 1983, the most
promising theory for enforcement of NCLB is third-party beneficiary
theory,
INTRODUCTION
Education is perhaps the most important function of state and local gov-
ernments. . . In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a
fight which must be made available to all on equal terms)
Despite the U.S. Supreme Court's recognition in 1954, in Brown
t Board of Education, that education is of paramount importance, six
million middle and high school students are still in danger of being
left behind.2 This problem is particularly pronounced for students
attending high-poverty schools. 3 Approximately twenty-five percent of
I Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2 See id.; Scut' r Jorrus, ALLIANCE FOR EXCELLENT EDUC., EVERY CRIED A GRA nuATE: A
FRAMEWORK FOR AN EXCELLENT EDUCATION FOR ALL MIDDLE AND HIGH SCHOOL
DENTS I (Sept. 2002), available at littp://www.all4ed.org/publications/EveryChildA-
Graditate/every.pdf. The number of children at risk may actually be higher. See 148 CoNG.
REc. 1-16780 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2002) (statement of Rep. Visclosky),
3 See jorrus, supra note 2, at 1.
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high school students are reading at "below basic" levels; in high-
poverty schools, this number may rise to over seventy percent. 4 Al-
though standardized test scores of fourth and eighth graders have in-
creased in mathematics, geography, and U.S. history, scores of twelfth
graders are either declining or showing little change. 5 Improvement
in test scores in the lower grades is not enough; over sixty percent of
students in high-poverty schools are scoring below basic levels in
math, and almost seventy percent are scoring below basic levels in sci-
ence.° Less than seventy-five percent of eighth graders are graduating
from high school within five years.? This percentage falls to fifty per-
cent in urban schools.8 Racial or ethnic minority status and poverty
place students at heightened risk of poor educational outcomes at a
time when these students are increasing in number. 9
Disparities in test scores between students of different races and
different socioeconomic classes are only one indication that all stu-
dents are not receiving the same opportunities to learn and achieve.°
Another indication of lack of educational opportunity is the inequal-
ity in per-pupil spending across the country, skewed across race and
class Iines. 11 Spending is particularly important because inequality of
educational resources has been linked to inequality of educational
achievement." Despite the Supreme Court's promise in Brown that
once a state has undertaken to provide its children with an education,
See 146 CONG. REC. 53232 (daily ed. May 2, 2000) (statement of Sen. Gregg); Jorrus,
supra note 2, at 1.
6 See 146 CONG. REC. 53235 (daily ed. May 2, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hutchinson);
NAT'L CIR. FOR EDUG. STATISlICS, U.S. 1)EP'1‘ or EDUC., THE CoNnITION or EDUCATION
2003 IN BRIEF' 8-10 (Andrea Livingston & John Wirt eds., 2003) [hereinafter Colunrilon],
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2003/2003068.pdf.
6 146 LONG. REG. S3232 (statement of Rep. Gregg).
Jorrus, supra note 2, at 1.
6 M.
° See 148 Cow.. REC. 56050 (daily ed. June 26. 2002) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); NAT I,
CTR. FOR EMIG. STATIsTICS, U.S. DEP'T Or EDUC., STATUS AND TRENDS IN THE EnociertoN or
BLACKS 48 (Sept. 2003), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2003/
2003034.pdf; NAT'L CIR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEF'T OF EDUC., TiI F: SOCIAL CONTEXT
Or EDUCATION 1 ( July 1997) [hereinafter SoCIAI. CONTEXA , available at http://nces.ed.gov/
pubs97/97981.pdf.
'° See jortus, supra note 2, at 1-2 (recognizing that many teachers in low-perfortMng
schools are underqualified). See Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 655 N.E.2d 611, 666-
67 (NX 1995), rcv'd on other pounds, 801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003), for further elaboration of
the term "educational opportunity."
II Molly McUsic, The Law's Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promises and Pitfalls of
School Finance Litigation, in LAW AND SCIlool. REFORM: SIX STRATEGIEs FOR PRoMMING
EnticanoNAL Ego rrY 88, 88 ( Jay P. fletibert ed., 1999).
12 See id. at 89,
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it must do so on equal terms, significant inequalities persist between
high-poverty and low-poverty schools. 13 Differences in indicators of
educational opportunity such as test scores, graduation rates, physical
facilities, curricular and extra-curricular offerings, access to qualified
teachers, and funding exemplify these inequalities. 14
Advocates for educational equity have appealed to the courts,
where they have achieved limited success.° They have also turned to
Congress, which responded by enacting Title I of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act (the "ESEA") in 1965. 0 The most recent en-
actment of the ESEA is the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 ("NCLB"
or the Act"). 17 NCLB proposes that setting standards and monitoring
students, schools, and states in the achievement of these standards will
improve the quality of education for all students.°
Part I of this Note discusses several legal theories that. plaintiffs
have advanced hi order to press courts to mandate a certain quality of
education.° Part H introduces NCLB, including its legislative history,
and focuses on several provisions of the Act that provide benefits for
students and their parents. 2° Part III outlines several theories for pirate
enforcement that plaintiffs have used successfully to secure benefits
conferred by other public programs. 21 Part. IV explores the potential of
NCLB for improving education. 22 It applies the legal theories discussed
in Part III to the context of NCLB and concludes that third-party
beneficiary theory is most likely to succeed in enforcing the statute. 23
13 See 347 U.S. at 493. See generally Socint. CoNTExT. supra note 9 (examining differ-
ences between high- and low-poverty schools).
14 See generally Socint. CONTEXT, supra note 9. For the purposes of this Note, "educa-
tional opportunity" refers to these indicators, and "educational equity" refers to equal access
to educational opportunity. See generally McUsic, supra note 11 (providing a more detailed
discussion of these topics).
13 See, e.g., Sail Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973); Peter W.
v. San Francisco, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 855 (Ct. App. 1976).
16
 Pub. L. No. 89-10. 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2002)).
17
 Pub. L. No. 107-110. 115 Stat. 1425 (2001) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6301).
18 See GEoRGE W. Busn, No Cum') LEFT BEHINg) 3, available at http://www.white-
house.gov/news/reports/no-child-left-behind.pdf  (last visited Apr. 6, 2004).
19 Sec infra notes 24-51 and accompanying text.
" Sec infra notes 52-114 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 115-214 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 215-309 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 215-309 and accompanying text.
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I. USING THE COURTS TO ENFORCE EQUITY IN EDUCATION
Faced with the contradiction between the U.S. Supreme Court's
pronouncement that education must be available to all students on
equal terms and the reality that many urban students face, advocates
for educational equity have turned to the court system for assistance. 24
The pursuit of quality education for all students has taken the form of
lawsuits premised on several different theories, including constitutional
law and educational malpractice. 25 Constitutional law claims have suc-
ceeded to some degree, but educational malpractice plaintiffs have not
been successful in the public school context. 26
A. The Limited Success of Constitutional Claims in
Achieving Educational Equity
Since the 1970s, many lawsuits for educational equity have fo-
cused on funding disparities among school districts as indicative of
lack of equal educational opportunity. 27 Animating these lawsuits is
the theory that without sufficient funding, high-poverty schools can-
not educate students adequately.28
 Early lawsuits for educational eq-
uity succeeded in challenging the constitutionality of state education-
financing systems, in state courts, t inder the Federal Equal Protection
24 See Kevin P. Mcfessy, Contract Law: The Proper Framework for Litigating Educational Li-
ability Claims, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1768, 1773 (1995).
2' See infra notes 27-49 and accompanying text for further discussion of constitutional
claims and educational malpractice claims. Plaintiffs have also advanced common-law theo-
ries of recovery under misrepresentation and breach of contract. See, e.g., Brown v.
Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 171, 171 (Ct. App. 1998); Paladino v. Acielphi
Univ., 454 N.Y.S.2d 868, 869-70 (App. Div. 1982). A detailed discussion of these claims is
beyond the scope of this Note, but readers may consult John G. Culhane, Reinvigorating
Educational 111(2/practice Claims: A Representational Focus, 67 %sit. L. REV, 349 (1992) or Todd
A. DeMitchell & Terri A. DeMitchell, Statutes and Standards: Has the Door to Educational Mal-
practice Been Opened?, 2003 BYU Emus. & L.J. 485 (2003) for further information. Frequently,
claims brought under state constitutions or statutes have been denied for the same policy
reasons as have common-law claims. See, e.g.. D.S.W. v. Fairbanks No. Star Borough Sch.
Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 556 (Alaska 1981); Peter W. v. San Francisco, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860-61
(Ct. App. 1976). But see B.M. v. State, 649 P.2d 425, 427 (Mont. 1982) (allowing educational
malpractice claims to go forward based on state statutory duty of care).
' 6 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. See infra notes 29-49 and accompanying
text for further discussion.
27 See. e.g., San MI01110 Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez. 411 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973); Edge-
wood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717. 725 (Tex. 1995); Rose v. Council for Bet-
ter Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Ky. 1989).
" See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 4-5; Edgewood. 917 S.W.2d at 725; Rose, 790 S.W.2d at
190; see also McUsic, supra note 11, at 89.
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amencnent. 29 In 1973, however, in San An-
tonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the U.S. Supreme Court
declined to find a federal constitutional right to education protected
under the Equal Protection Clause." In Rodriguez, parents of children
attending schools in an urban district brought. a class action lawsuit on
behalf of minority and poor students residing in school districts with
low property tax bases." The Court applied rational basis scrutiny in
upholding the Texas system of financing education, finding that no
fundamental right existed to justify application of strict scrutiny. 32
No claimant since Rodriguez has asserted a federal constitutional
right to education successfully.33 As a result, plaintiffs have challenged
school financing under education and equal protection clauses of state
constitutions." Despite several court decisions in plaintiffs' favor, in
most states a district's property wealth continues to be linked to per-
student spending." Districts with little property wealth have lower tax
bases, and therefore, less money to spend on schools." This inequality
of educational resources corresponds to inequality of educational
achievement. 37 Given current gaps in performance on many measures
of adequacy, it is clear that even successful lawsuits premised on state
constitutional guarantees have not resulted in equitable education. 38
29 Sec Rodriguez v. San Antonio hide!). Sch. Dist„ 337 F. Stepp. 280, 285 (W.D. Tex.
1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. at 1; Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971).
30
 411 U.S. at 35.
31
 Id. at 4-5.
52 See id. at 35.
33 See. e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (stating that education is not a right
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution). But ef. Kardmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch, 487 U.S. 450,
466 n.1 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring to Rodriguez as having left open the ques-
tion of whether a deprivation of access to a minimally adequate education would violate a
fundamental constitutional right); Papasan v. Main, 478 U.S. 265. 285 (1986) (observing
that the Court has not determined definitively that a minimally adequate education is not a
fundainental right).
3+ See, e.g., Edgewood, 917 S.W.2d at 726; Abbot v. Burke, 575 A.2c1 359, 363 (N.J. 1990);
Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215. A detailed discussion of school finance litigation is beyond the
scope of this Note, but readers may want to consult Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719
NXS.2d 475 (App. Div. 2001) for further discussion.
55 See Edgewood, 917 S.W.2d at 726; 148 CONG, REC, S6050 (daily ed. June 26, 2002)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy); we also WILLIAM H USSAR /4: WILLIAM SONNENBERG, Tht:uns
DisrARrriEs IN SCHOOL DISTRICT EXPENDMIRES PER PUPIL 31 (Jan. 2000), available at
http://n ces.ed.gov/pubs2000/2000020.pdf.
36 Sec McUsic, supra note 11, at 88.
37 Id. at 89.
IS Sec Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 655 N.E.2d at 667; Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 218; Jorrus, su-
pra note 2. at 1. Campaign for Fiscal Equity and Rose provide detailed examples of how courts
have defined adequate education. See campaign for Fiscal Equity. 655 N.E.2d at 661, 667;
Rose., 790 S.W.2d at 212 & 11.22.
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B. The Failure of Educational Malpractice to Achieve Educational Equity
In addition to constitutional claims, plaintiffs have alleged educa-
tional malpractice." Generally, professional malpractice has been
defined as failure to exercise the skills required for one's job. 4° A suc-
cessful malpractice suit requires plaintiffs to show that the defendants
owed them a duty of care, that the defendants breached this duty of
care, and that they suffered injury from this breach of duty.'" For the
most part, educational malpractice plaintiffs have not succeeded in
recovering under this theory.42
The failure of educational malpractice as a tort is due largely to
the absence of agreement on whether educators owe students a duty
of care, and if so, how to measure whether educators have met this
duty. 43 This concern arose in the first adjudication of an educational
malpractice case:" In 1976, in Peter W v. San Francisco Unified School
District, the California Court of Appeals held that a public school stu-
dent may not sue school administrators for providing an inadequate
education.45 The plaintiff, who graduated from high school unable to
read above the fifth-grade level, asserted that he had not been edu-
cated adequately because of the negligence of the defendant school
district, its agents, and employees." The court denied recovery based
on the plaintiff's inability to demonstrate that defendants owed him a
duty of care.47 The court also noted that because of conflicting theo-
ries of pedagogy, the absence of acceptable standards of care, and the
potential for burdensome litigation, it would abstain from imposing
liability on public policy grounds." The court's holding in Peter W,
that educators owe no duty of care to students, as well as its decision
39 See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1992); Fairbanks, 628
P.2d at 555; Peter 111., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
40 Culhane, supra note 25, at 371.
41 See PROSSER AND KEETON ON IDE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (W. Page Keeton ed.. 5th ed.
1984).
42 See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Stipp. 1319, 1327 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ("Educa-
tional malpractice is a tort theory beloved of commentators, but not of courts."), overruled
on other grounds, 957 F.2d at 417; Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 172; Peter W,
131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
43 See Hunter v. Bd. of Ethic., 439 A.2d 582, 584 (Md. 1982); Fairbanks, 628 P.2d at 556;
Peter W, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
44 See Peter W, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
" Id. at 855.
46 Id. at 856.
" See id. at 858.
49 See id. at 860-61.
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to abstain from imposing liability for public policy reasons, has been
widely followed to deny recovery for educational malpractice: 19
Because lawsuits have failed to realize equal educational oppor-
tunity for all students, advocates have explored other avenues to
achieve this goal 5° In particular, advocates have turned to the federal
legislative process to achieve educational equity."
II, THE No CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT OF 2001
From this day forward, all students will have a better chance to learn, to ex-
cel, and to live out their dreants. 52
Despite efforts to achieve equity in education through lawsuits al-
leging constitutional violations and educational malpractice, schools
have failed to improve.° Poor minority students in large urban districts
continue to bear the brunt of this failure." At the same time that advo-
cates were appealing to the courts to improve education, they were
pushing the federal government to enact legislation to accomplish this
goal.° The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 ("NCLB" or "the Act") is
the most recent federal legislative effort to improve educational equity.°
4° See Peter W, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861; see, e.g., Fairbanks, 628 13.2{1 at 556: Donohue v. Co-
piague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1354 (N.V. 1979).
5° See infra notes 52-114 and accompanying text.
" Sec infra notes 52-114 and accompanying text.
52 Statement by President of the United States (Jan. 8, 2002). 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1614,
1615 [hereinafter Statement].
53 Seciorius, supm. note 2, at 7-11; HousE Elmo. Se . 111E WORKFORCE. Comm., H.R. I CON-
FERENCE REPORT SUMMARY: PRESIDENT BUSH'S No Cumn Ln.-r Bump EDUCA'llON REFORM
IIII.1„ at littp://edworkforce.housegov/isstiesil07thieducation/nclh/confrepIstun.hun (Dec.
10, 2001, updated Oct. 2002) [hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT SUMMARY]; INDEX. REVIEW
PANEL (IRP), IMPROVING ODDS: A REPORT UN Trim: I FROM '11111 INDEPENDENT REVIEW
PANEL 2 (2001), available at Intp://www.ctredpolorg/pubs/improvingodds repornidei
itp/improvingoddsreporttitleipanel.pdE
54 SCC CONFERENCE REPORT SUMMARY, supm note 53; Judith A. Winston. Achieving Excellence
and Equal Opportunity in Education: No Conflict of Laws, 53 AumIN. 1,. REV. 997, 1014 (2001); The
Achievement Gap, Lime. WEEK, Jan. 21, 2004, at 16, available at littp://www.edweek.orgiew/
ewstory.cfm?shig=198rown-bl.h23&keywords=The%20Achievement%20Gap.
65 See infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text for further discussion of legislation
aimed at improving educational opportunity for disadvantaged students.
56 Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2002)).
The final regulations were issued by the Department of Education and published on De-
cember 2, 2002. 34 C.F.R. § 200 (2002).
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A. NCLB and Its Provisions
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (the
"ESEA") was adopted in 1965 to aid disadvantaged students. 57 Title I
provided federal funds as supplementary aid tied directly to eligible
students, who were selected based on test scores." In its first thirty
years, Title I aimed to bring economically disadvantaged children up
to basic levels of achievement and did not achieve even that modest
objective." In 1994, Congress revised the ESEA by passing the Improv-
ing America's Schools Act of 1994. 60 Improving America's Schools re-
vised the ESEA's focus on the attainment of basic skills for poor chil-
dren and imposed a requirement of high standards for all students. 61
By 2001, however, the academic gap between rich and poor, white and
non-white students, not only existed, but was growing wider. 62
When President George W. Bush signed NCLB on January 8, 2002,
he touted it as the beginning of a new era.° NCLB aims to ensure ex-
cellence and equity in educational achievement for all students by nar-
rowing the achievement gap between disadvantaged students and their
affluent peers." Its main provisions seek to increase flexibility for states
and school districts, fund research-based programs and practices, em-
power parents, and increase accountability for student performance by
rewarding and sanctioning districts and schools based on students'
academic achievemen t 65
57 See Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 6301); Peter
Zamora, Note, In Recognition of the Special Educational Needs of Low-Income Families?: Ideological
Discord and Its Effects Upon 71tk I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Acts of 1965 and
2001,10 GEo. J. ON POVERTY L. & POCY 413, 424 (2003).
66 See Pub. L. No. 89-10 § 201, 79 Stat. 27; 1R1', supra note 53, at 2.
62 See 146 CONG. REC. 53232 (daily ed. May 2, 2000) (statement of Sen. Gregg); IRP,
supra note 53, at 2-3.
60
 Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103.382, 108 Stat. 3518 (cur-
rent version at 20 U.S.C. § 6301); see also 1RP, supra note 53, at 3.
61 See S. Rep. No. 103-292 (1994), LEX1S, 103 S. Rpt. 292; see also IRP, supra note 53, at 4.
62
 See Leave No Child Behind: Heating Before the House Committee on Education and the iVorkforce.
107th Cong. 2 (2001) (statement of Rep. John Boehner, Chair, Committee on Education and
the Workforce), available at littp://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-binigetdoccgi?dbname=107
_house hearings&docid=f:77901.pdf; 147 CONG. REC. E437 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2001) (statement
of Rep. Boehner).
65 See Statement, supra note 52, at 1614 ("America's schools will be on a new path of re-
form and a new path of results.").
64 See 20 U.S.C. § 6301; 147 CONG. REC. 1-12188 (daily ed. May 16, 2001) (statement of
Rep. Ballenger).
66 See Busii, supra note 18, at 2. This Note focuses on several of the many provisions of
the Act. Sec infra notes 67-85 and accompanying text. Throughout this Note, the term
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NCLB emphasizes stronger accountability.66 The Act requires, for
example, that each state develop a single statewide system of challeng-
ing academic content and achievement standards that is consistent
with professionally recognized stall Each state's educational
agency must then implement annual testing designed to measure all
students' achievement of the standards.68 The tests must be aligned
with the state's standards and may be used only for purposes for
which they are valid and reliable. 69 States must then report test. results
annually to the public, disaggregated within every state, district, and
school by gender, race, ethnicity, English proficiency, and migrant
status, to enable comparisons among these groups." The Act requires
that by the end of the 2013-2014 school year, all students in each
group meet proficiency on academic achievement, as defined by the
state and determined by performance on the state assessment. 71 To
meet this goal, school-wide programs must include activities to assist
students who are experiencing difficulty mastering the proficient, or
advanced levels of academic achievement standards. 72
In order to hold schools accountable, NCLB provides that stu-
dents will not be trapped in schools that fail to make progress toward
the goal of proficiency for all students.73 States are required to estab-
lish statewide proficiency and progress objectives that will enable all
students to reach proficiency by the target date of 2014. 74 States must
sanction schools that fail to meet targets by imposing increasing de-
"school district" includes local educational agency," as used in NCLB. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.
§ 6301.
66 See infra notes 67-85 and accompanying text for further discussion.
67 20 U.S.C. § 6311(h) (3) (C) (i)—(ii).
68 See id. Students are to be assessed at least once per period during grades 3 through
5, 6 through 9, and 10 through 12, in mathematics and reading/language arts and, begin-
ning in 2007-2008, in science. Id. § 6311(b) (3) (C) (v).
69 Id. § 6311 (b) (3) (C) (ii)—(iii).
713 Id. § 6311 (b) (3) (C) (xiii), ( It) (1) (C) (i)—(ii).
71 Id. § 6311(b) (2) (F).
72Sec 20 U.S.C. § 6314 (b) (1)(1) (providing that effective. timely additional assistance to
struggling students shall include identification of the difficulties and sufficient informa-
tion on which to base effective assistance).
73 See 147 Corm. Rxc. H1179 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2001) (statement of Rep. Keller)
(characterizing transfer and supplemental services options as a "safety valve" for students
trapped in "persistently failing schools"); Bowl, supra note 18. at 7.
74 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (b) (2) (E)—(H). NCLB defines Adequate Yearly Progress ("AW") as
targeted increments that a school or school district must reach on a yearly basis in order to
demonstrate by 2014 that one-hundred percent of all students participating in assessments
have achieved proficiency. See id.
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grees of corrective action:" After a school has failed to make ade-
quate yearly progress ("MP") for two consecutive years, parents have
the unqualified right to transfer their children to another district
school that is not in need of improvement." If the district does not
have an acceptable school, parents have a qualified right to transfer
children to schools run by other local educational agencies in the
area.77
 Parents must be informed of this right no later than the first
day of the school year following such identification, and priority is
given to the lowest-achieving students from low-income families. 78
the school fails to make AYP the following year, parents must again be
notified, and they may continue to transfer their children as above, or
they may, instead, receive supplemental services free of charge."
Taken together, these provisions give students the right to attend a
school that is making AYP.8°
Students and parents receive additional rights under NCLB. 81 Stu-
dents who attend a "persistently dangerous" school or become victims
of violent crime on school grounds are permitted to transfer to a safe
school within the school district. 82 Under NCLB, parents also have the
right to be involved meaningfully in planning and implementing all
programs assisted by NCLB. 83
 The Act contains additional notice provi-
sions to keep parents apprised of how well their children's schools are
meeting the requirements imposed by NCLB. 84 States must also make
75 See id. § 6316.
78
 Id. § 6316(b)(1)(E).
" Id. § 6316(b) (11). This right is qualified in that NCLB directs school districts in this
situation, to the extent practicable, to establish a cooperative agreement with other local
educational agencies. Id. If school districts are unable to establish such an agreement, stu-
dents may not be able to transfer. See id.
78 1d § 6316(b) (6), (b) (1) (E) (ii).
79 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b) (6), (b) (8)—(10), (e). If the school fails to make adequate progress
for a fourth year, the district must implement corrective actions, such as replacing staff or
changing the curriculum, and after a fifth year, the school would be identified for reconstitu-
tion, and required to alter its governance structure. See id.; Erik Robelen, An ESE,4 Primer,
Enuc. WEEK, Jan. 9, 2002, at 28, available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/ew_printstory.cfm?
sltig=16eseabox.1121.
a° See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311(b) (2) (E)—(H), 6316; 147 CONG. REC. H1179 (daily ed. Mar.
27, 2001) (statement of Rep. Keller).
81 See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
82 See20 U.S.C. § 7912.
fa See id. § 6318(a) (2), (c)—(e); see also Paul VVeckstein, Enforceable Rights to Quality Edu-
cation, in LAW AND SCII001 REFORM: SIX SIVATEGIES FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL Ett
urrY 306, 330 ( Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999) (characterizing parent involvement requirements
of Title I as "substantial, detailed rights").
84 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (h) (1) (B) (ii), (h) (1) (C) (vii)—(viii), (h) (2) (B), (h)(2)(E) (requiring
states and school districts to keep parents informed of their progress toward requirements
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available to the public, through annual report cards, information on
their progress toward NCLB objectives. 85
B. Legislative History and Public Perceptions of NCLB
The legislative history of NCLB, as well as the publicity that sur-
rounded its passage, emphasizes a new federal role in education, one
which places children at the center. 88 Its purpose is to ensure educa-
tional opportunity for all children.87 Donald Payne, who worked on
NCLB as a member of the House Committee on Education and the
Workforce in the 107th Congress, wrote an article about the process. 88
Payne describes the Act as targeting federal funds to needy communi-
ties and empowering parents by requiring that they be informed
about school quality and be involved with school plans. 89
The White House and members of Congress assert that NCLB
contains several important provisions for the improvement of educa-
tion.9° It increases the amount of resources available and targets dis-
advantaged areas. 9 1 NCLB makes 'schools accountable by establishing
including AYP and the requirement imposed by § 6319(a) (3) that all public school teachers
be highly qualified by the end of the 2005-2006 school year). Section 0312(g) (I )(A) requires
that parents he notified if a child has been identified as limited English proficient and will be
placed in a language instruction education program, and §6312(g)(1)(A)(vhi)(aa) gives
parents the right to remove their child from this program, once informed. See id,
§ 6312(g) (1)(A).
28 See id. § 6311 (b)(2)(E).
ea See 147 CLING. REC. E929 (daily ed. May 24, 2001) (statement of Rep. Rogers); 146
CONG. REc. 53233 (daily ed. May 2, 2000) (statement of Sen. Gregg) ("['Phis] is a debate
over the fundamental question of how we improve education for our children, and
specifically for our low-income children."); Rost', supra note 18 ("The federal role in educa-
tion is not to serve the system. It is to serve the children [.1"). But see 147 CONC.. R ► c. E976
(daily ed. May 25, 2001) (statement of Rep. Rangel) (suggesting that the focus of the bill is
America's economic growth and linking the education of America's poor to the country's
economic future).
87 20 U.S.C. § 6301; see 149 Com:. REc. S194 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Gregg) ("[T]he purpose of the bill is to make sure kids learn.... They now have a law they
can follow which allows them to make sure that kids do leant."); Press Release, Conunittec on
Education and the Workforce, House Speaker J. Dennis Hastert (R-IL) Praises Passage of
Education Reform (Dec. 13, 2001), http://edworkforce.house.gov/press/press107/
hastert121301.1am ("This common-sense education plan is designed to give our children
every possible opportunity to learn, succeed in school and go on to college.").
98 Sec generally Donald Payne. Reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act: Challenges Throughout the Legislative Process, 26 SKWN HALL LEG'S. J. 315 (2002).
89 Id. at 321-22.
9° See supra notes 65-85 and accompanying text and infra notes 91-97 and accompa-
nying text for further discussion of these provisions.
91 Sec H.R. REP. No. 107-063, pt. 1, at 1242 (2001), http://www.congress.gov/cgi-bin/
cpqn ery/ R?cp107:FLD 010A 1 (hr063) . 	 •
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timelines for achievement of objectives and consequences for failure
to meet these objectives.92
 Schools and school districts also become
more accountable because of NCLB's requirements of parent
notification and publication of annual report cards demonstrating pro-
gress, or lack thereof.93
 NCLB offers parents educational options, free-
ing their children from persistently failing schools.94 NCLB helps to fo-
cus attention on the achievement gap between disadvantaged groups
and their more advantaged peers by requiring collection of disaggre-
gated data and reporting that enables comparisons 9 5 It enhances local
control over education by giving states the flexibility to transfer up to
fifty percent of federal Title I funding within Title I programs, as well as
the ability to design their own standards and systems of assessment. 98
Finally, it represents a significant commitment of federal dollars to edu-
cation.97
92 See ]47 Conic, REC. E2327 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2001) (statement of Rep. Freling-
huysen); Bust', supra note 18, at 3.
03 See 147 CONG. REC. £2327; Busit, supra note 18, at 2-3; see also Ellen R, Delisio, Paige,
Kennedy on No Child Left Behind Act, Educ. World, at http://www.educationworld.com/
a_issues/issues309.shtnil (May 2, 2002) (explaining that NCLB provides more educational
and financial accountability because it provides parents with more information about
schools).
94 See, e.g., WII ITE HO USE,, FACT SII EET: No CII ILD LEFT BEHIND Act; at
hup://wmv.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020108.hunl
 ( Jan. 2002) [herein-
after FAcT Sit EE'rj . For further elaboration of parents' rights, see JonN BOEH N & JU DD
GREGG, TITLE I RESOURCES FOR REFORM: NEW HOPE FOR AMERICA'S MOST DISADVAN-
TAGED Volum Scitoot.s 6 ( July 9, 2002), available at http://edworkforce.house.gov/
issties/107tWeducation/nclb/boelmergreggreport.pdf.
95 See H.R. REP. No. 107-063, supra note 91, at 1242; Press Release, House-Senate Edu-
cation Conference Report: No Child Left Behind (revised Dec. 12, 2001), hup://www.ed.
gov/news/pressreleases/2001/12/
 12112001b.html. But see Thomas Toch, Bush's Big Test,
WAsti. 11torrnitx, Nov. 2001. at 12. 16 (stating that the smaller size of these subgroups ex-
acerbates problems in the use of testing to determine which schools are in need of im-
provement, because of regular fluctuations in test scores front year to year).
96 See, e.g., 147 CoNG. REC. E2329-30 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2001) (statement of Rep.
Petri); BOEH N ER & GREGG, supra note 94, at 5-6; FACT SII Err, supra note 94.
97 See HOUSE EDUC. & 111E WORKFORCE COMMITTEE, FACT SitEry. FY 2004 APPROPRIA-
TIONS, KEEPING EDUCAllON AMONG 111E HIGHEST l'itroRmis, EVEN IN A TIME OF ECONOMIC
UNCERTAINTY AND FISCAL RESTRAINT ( July 23, 2003), at Imp://edworkforce.house.gov/
issties/108th/editcation/nclb/factsbeet072303.hun; HOUSE EDUC. & Tim WORKFORCE COM-
MITTEE, FACT SHEET: No CHILD LEFT BEHIND: SPENDING MORE THAN EVER—AND EXPECTING
MORE THAN EVER (July 23, 2003), at hup://edworkforce.house.gov/issues/108th/edu
cation/nclb/factvfiction072303.11tm [hereinafter SPENDING]. But see 149 CONG. REC. SI00
(daily ed. Jan. 9, 2003) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (stating that President Bush proposed
only a 3.6% increase in funding of the ESEA, which Congress increased to 20%).
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Not everyone, however, believes that NCLB represents a positive
step toward educational equity.98 The Act has garnered much criti-
cism, particularly for its overemphasis on testing. 99 Numerous educa-
tors and politicians have attacked NCLB's focus on testing as the pri-
mary assessment of schools' progress, asserting that testing does not
tell the whole story, that it prompts teachers to "teach to the test,"
thereby giving other aspects of the curriculum short shrift, and that it
leads to the loss of time that could be spent on other educational ac-
tivities. 100 Opponents contend that NCLB is structured to provide in-
centives for states to create lower standards and easier tests so that it is
easier to show progress. 11" Furthermore, they suggest it provides in-
centives for schools to allow underperforming students to drop out of
school, rather than expend resources attempting to educate them. 102
Finally, the major criticism leveled at NCLB is that it is an un-
funded mandate- 10s It requires that states participate in annual testing
98 See infra notes 99-107 and accotnpanying text for further discussion of criticism of
NCLB.
" See infra notes 100-102 and accompanying text for further discussion of criticism of
NCLB's focus on testing.
100 See. e.g.. H.R. REP. No. 107-063. supra note 91, at 1240 ("EWle remain concerned
that the bill goes too far in its reliance on standardized testing."); 147 CONG. REC. 11137
(daily ed. Jan. 31, 2001) (statement of Rep. Underwood) ("1 am concerned about the
overreliance of testing as the only measure of educational successes.... ['Me must think
about other ways to measure the school environment ...." ); Toch, supra note 95, at 14.
But cf. SPENDING, supra note 97 (quoting President Bush as saying that "if you're teaching
to the test, and the test is designed to confirm that children are snaking progress in read-
ing and math, that's the whole idea.").
101 See SPENDING, supra note 97 (asserting that NCLB provides states with enough money
to administer the required federal testing, but acknowledging that testing costs could be
higher if states choose to design and implement more intricate testing systems than those
required under the bill); Toch, supra note 95, at 15; Press Release, Committee on Education
and the Workforce, Boehner Backs Secretary Paige's Strong Stand on State Education Stan-
dards (Oct. 23. 2002), hop://edworkforce.house.gov/press/press107/paigeletter102302.hun
(noting that some states have lowered standards and expectations to hide the low perform-
ance of their schools or to remove schools from lists of low performers).
102 Sec Nat'l Educ. Ass'n (NEA), No Child Left Behind?, NEA Toms', May 2003,
http://www.nea.org/neatoday/0305/cover.html . NCLB has also been charged with leaving
behind bilingual students. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. E1143 (daily ed. June 19, 2001) (state-
ment of Rep. Rodriguez); 147 GONG. REC. E992 (daily ed. May 25, 2001) (statement of
Rep. Pastor). Many critics also claim that NCLB is only the first step in privatizing public
education, a goal they believe is at the heart of the bill, because of its transfer and man-
dated corrective-action provisions. See, e.g., 148 Corm. REG. 58151 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 2002)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy).
1 °3 See 149 CONG. REC. 5100 (daily ed. Jan. 9. 2003) (statement of Sen. Durbin). But see
SPENDING, supra note 97 (asserting that NCLB is neither unfunded, nor a mandate; the bill
did not promise a particular amount of money, and states are free to opt out of receiving
federal education funds).
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using the federally designed National Assessment of Educational Pro-
gress, as well as design their own standards and testing systems, with-
out appropriating sufficient money for these tasks. 1" Although Presi-
dent Bush cites increased spending on education, critics assert that
the money promised has never been delivered. 105 Members of the
107th Congress expressed their concern regularly over passing NCLB,
then underfunding it. 106 Concern has continued into the 1081h Con-
gress, where bills have been introduced to forestall requirements that
schools and states comply with NCLB until it is fully funded.w 7
C. The Future of NCLB
Despite NCLB's alleged shortcomings and one commentator's
claim that the Act is unconstitutional, it appears that NCLB is here to
stay)" In 2003, in Kegerreis v. United Stales, the Federal District Court for
the District of Kansas declined to hold NCLB unconstitutional.mg The
court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that sovereign immunity prevented
the plaintiff, a public school teacher, from suing the United States."°
The court declined to substitute the Secretary of the Department of
Education as the defendant, finding that the plaintiff had not articu-
lated how NCLB violated his constitutional rights.iii
104 See 147 CONG. REC. E1143 ("In the name of accountability, more testing will be
mandated with little financial support from the federal government."). But see SPENDING,
supra note 97 (stating that several studies show the federal government is giving states
more than enough money to pay for the testing required by NCLB).
103 See NEA, supra note 102; David E. Sanger, Bush, at School, Promotes Education Bill, N.Y.
Tutus, May 7, 2002, at A18. But see SPENDING, supra note 97 (asserting that NCLB does not
impose any overall funding levels for fiscal year 2003 or beyond; it only authorizes Con-
gress to spend "such sums as may be required" overall to implement education reforms
authorized or promised by NCLB). Where there are specific funding levels, they are only
spending caps, not promises. See id.
1°6 See, e.g.. 148 Conn. Rec. E1561 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2002) (statement of Rep. Moore);
148 CONG. REC. 54341 (daily ed. May 15, 2002) (statement of Sen. Durbin). Senator Ken-
nedy, initially a sponsor of the bill, has expressed concern repeatedly with continued failures
to fund it at acceptable levels. See, e.g., 148 CoNG. REC. 58151.
107 See, e.g., 149 CoNG. Rec. E2448 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 2003) (statement of Rep. Schiff);
149 CONG. Rec. 1-13766 (daily ed. May 8, 2003) (statement of Rep. Etheridge).
ma See Kegerreis v. United States, No. 02-2232, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18012, at *8 (D.
Kan. Oct. 9, 2003); Ronald D. Wenkart, The No Child Left Behind Act and Congress' Power to
Regulate Under the Spending Clause, 174 Enuc. LAW REP. 589, 597 (2003) (suggesting that
several provisions of NCLB exceed Congress's Spending Clause powers).
109 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18012, at *8.
I 10
 Id. at *3-6, *8.
111 Id. at *7 •
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Assuming NCLB is constitutional, it may mirror the ESEA in fail-
ing to attain its intended beneficial effects because it provides for rela-
tively weak federal oversight." 2 It remains to be seen how firm the fed-
eral government will be in requiring states and school districts to
adhere to•NCLB. 1 " For this reason, the students and parents for whom
NCLB provides benefits may need to explore options for private en-
forcement of the Act.i"
III. THEORIES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF BENEFITS CONFERRED
BY PUBLIC PROGRAMS
In light of the failures of lawsuits premised on constitutional viola-
tions and educational malpractice to achieve educational equity, plain-
tiffs and their advocates may consider using legislation, such as NCLB,
to achieve this end. 115 NCLB aims to improve educational opportunity
112 Sec S. REr. No. 107-7, at 151 (2001), available at http://frwebgate ,access.gpo.gov/
cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbnanne=107_cong_reports&docid=fmr007.107.pdf (stating that there
is no federal oversight of the quality of tests chosen by states); Bush!, supra note 18, at 8
(explaining that states select and design their own assessments).
113 See William L. Taylor, Title I as an Instrument for Achieving Desegregation and Equal Edu-
cational Opportunity, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1751, 1759-60 (2003) (discussing the Department of
Education's "culture of nonenforcement"); Catherine Gewertz, Miming Aid Falling Short of
Mandate, EDUC. WEEK, Feb. 25. 2004, at 1 (stating that many students eligible for tutoring
services are not receiving them); Mary Leonard, Schools Reported Lagging New Law, ROS'ION
GLOBE, Jan. 4, 2003, at AS (noting that states are moving slowly in providing parents of
students in underperforming schools with supplemental educational services or school
choice); Lynn Olson, Data Doubts Plague States, Federal Law, EDUC, WEEK, Jan. 7, 2004, at 1
(indicating that many states have given schools leeway in meeting progress goals). Many
states have failed to meet even the less demanding requirements of the Improving Amer-
ica's Schools Act of 1994, yet no state has lost federal funding as a result of this failure. See
147 CONC. REC. E989 (daily ed. May 25, 2001) (statement of Rep. Jones); Toch, supra note
95. at 15 (noting that only seventeen states have implemented the tests required by the
Improving America's Schools Act of 1994).
114 See Taylor, supra note 113, at 1759-60; Leonard, supra note 113, at A3; Toch, sup?
note 95, at 15. The ESEA. NCLB's predecessor, was enforced privately in 1973. See Nichol-
son v. Pittenger, 364 F. Stipp. 669, 676 (E.D. Pa. 1973). In 1973, in Nicholson v. Pittenger, the
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania enjoined the Secretary of
the Pennsylvania Department of Education from granting ESEA Title I funds to the School
District of Philadelphia for the 1973-1974 school year, unless the School District could
demonstrate that it had met the statute's requirements. Id. The plaintiffs, poor parents of
children attending School District of Philadelphia schools, alleged that the state had ap-
proved Philadelphia's applications for funding without making several determinations
required by the statute as conditions of funding. Id. at 671. Although the court granted
plaintiffs' requests for declaratory judgment and an injunction. it did not explicitly. state
the legal theory under which it granted relief. Id. at 673-76.
'" See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 855 (Ct. App. 1976); The
Achievement Gap, supra note 54, at 16; CONIpEEION. supra note 5, at 8-10. See supra notes
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by emphasizing accountability.H 6 Thus far, however, the federal gov-
ernment has not enforced NCLB against states and schools that have
failed to meet its mandates. 117 If the government continues to give
money to states and schools under NCLB without holding them ac-
countable for complying with the Act's provisions, the government
may fail to accomplish NCLB's stated objectives.ns Rather than rely
on federal enforcement of NCLB to accomplish these objectives, edu-
cational equity plaintiffs may consider private enforcement, looking
to legal theories that have been successful in enforcing other public
programs.' 19
In the United States, federal grant-in-aid programs grew
significantly in the 1960s and 1970s, resulting in an increasing number
of beneficiaries who received funds through several different state
agencies.'" The federal agencies that provide grants under federal
grant-in-aid programs are usually responsible for ensuring a state's
compliance with conditions attached to these grants.' 21 In fact, where
the federal government provides financial aid, it may enforce attached
conditions in several ways, such as denying funds in the future, de-
manding restitution of sums already paid, or obtaining a judicial man-
date that the recipient comply with conditions it has accepted. 122 Nev-
ertheless, federal agencies' emphases on the preservation of good
relationships with state administrators and the maintenance of popular
programs often outweigh their concern for individual beneficiaries.'"
Because of these concerns, agencies often do not impose sanctions for
failure to meet conditions.' 24
For the benefits secured under grant-in-aid programs to be
meaningful, they must be enforceable.1 25 Litigants have advanced sev-
27-49. 63-65 and accompanying text for further discussion of these legal theories and
their failure to achieve educational equity.
Ha See 147 CONC. RtIc. E437 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2001) (statement of Rep. Boehner);
Delisio, supra note 93.
1 " See 147 CONG. REC. E989 (daily ed. May 25. 2001) (statement of Rep. Jones); Leon-
ard, supra note 113, at A3; Toch, supra note 95, at 15.
''a See 147 CONG. REC. E989; Leonard, supra note 113, at A3; Toch, supra note 95, at 15.
IS See supra notes 65-85 and accompanying text for discussion of the benefits pro-
vided by NCLB.
1 " Bradford C. Mank, Suing Under 5 1983: The Future After Gonzaga University v. Doe,
39 Hous. L. REV. 1417, 1428 (2003).
121 Id. at 1431.
122 David E. Engdahl, The Spending Pouter, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 93 (1994).
122 Mank, supra note 120, at 1432.
124 Id. at 1431-32.
122 See infra notes 129-214 for discussion of efforts to enforce benefits secured tinder
grant-in-aid programs.
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eral theories to accomplish this end, including implied private right
of action, the application of § 1983, and third-party beneficiary the-
ory.'" Because the courts have limited recovery significantly tinder
implied private right of action and § 1983 theories over the past few
years, interest has grown in the enforcement of rights through con-
tract. analysis. 127
A. The Emergence of Pfivate Right of Action Theory to
Enforce Federal Statutes
Prior to 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court generally refused to en-
force a federal statute through a lawsuit if the statute did not authorize
private enforcement expressly. 12s In 1964, in J.I. Case Co. v. Borah, the
Court held that private parties had a cause of action under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act for rescission or damages. 129 In Barak, a stockholder
of J.I. Case Company alleged that a merger effected through the circu-
lation of a misleading proxy statement violated the Securities Exchange
Act.'" Because the statute did not authorize private lawsuits explicitly,
the Court's holding recognized an implied cause of action."' Between
1964 and 1975, the Court recognized implied private rights of action
126 See Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 1967); Malik. supra
note 120, at 1481. Implied private right of action is characterized as the idea that a court
may "find" legislative intent to permit an individual to enforce a federal statute in the ab-
sence of express language to that effect. See infra notes 129-145 for further discussion of
this cause of action. Section 1983 provides the following:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or itninu-
nities secured by the Constitution and laws. shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C.§ 1983 (2000).
127 See Mank, supra note 120, at 1426-27, 1450 (suggesting that the U.S. Supreme
Court has increasingly narrowed its interpretation of implied private rights of action and
enforceability of federal statutes through § 1983); Anthony John Waters, The Property in the
Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 14Auv. L. REv. 1109, 1173 (1985). See
infra notes 129-214 for further discussion of the use and development of these causes of
action.
126 See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 735 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); Mank,
supra note 120, at 1423.
129 See377 U.S. 426.430-31 (1964); Mank, supra note 120. at 1423.
13° See377 U.S. at 427.
191 See id. at 432; Mank. supra note 120, at 1423.
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under a number of statutes, enabling private parties to bring lawsuits
to eitforce them."-
In 1975, in Colt v. Ash, the U.S. Supreme Court held that there is
no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 610, and in doing so,
refined implied right of action jurisprudence.'" The plaintiff, a cor-
porate stockholder, brought an action for damages against corporate
directors under this criminal statute." 4 In its opinion, the Court out-
lined a four-part test for determining whether a private remedy is im-
plicit in a statute: (1 ) Is the plaintiff part of a class to which the statute
intends to provide special status or benefits?; (2) Is there implicit or
explicit evidence that Congress intended to create or deny the pro-
posed right of action?; (3) Is allowing a private right of action as an
implied remedy for the plaintiff consistent with the underlying pur-
pose of the legislative scheme?; (4) Is the cause of action one tradi-
tionally relegated to state law and, thus, in an area where a federal
action would intrude on important state concerns?'" Since 1975,
courts have followed this test to decide whether a statute creates an
implied private right of action
In applying the Cori test, courts have focused on its second
prong—whether significant evidence demonstrates congressional in-
tent to create a private right of action."7 lb prevail under this test,
even where a statute creates rights, a plaintiff must also demonstrate
intent to create a private remedy." 8 Recently, the Court further nar-
rowed implied private rights of action." 9 In 2001, in Alexander v. San-
doval, the Court held that there is no private right of action to enforce
132 See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (reviewing use of implied
private right of action theory); Man k, supra note 120, at 1423.
183 See 422 U.S. 66, 68-69 (1975).
134
 See id. at 68.
133 Id. at 78.
136 See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001); Suter v. Artist M., 503
U.S. 347, 363 (1992); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clarnmers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
' 37
 See, e.g., Alexander; 532 U.S. at 286, 293 (focusing on Congress's intent and finding
no hnplied private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated
tinder § 602 of Title VI); Sea Clantmers, 453 U.S. at 13, 14 (focusing on legislative intent and
finding no private right of action to enforce violations of the Federal Water Protection
Control Act or the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972); Permlitirst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Haldeman, 451 U.S. 1, 18 (1981) (finding no private right of action
to enforce the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act because Con-
gress only intended it to be a funding statute).
1313 See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. V. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979); !dank,
supra note 120, at 1425.
139 See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 288.
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disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI. 14° The
plaintiff challenged, under § 602 of Title VI, the Alabama Department
of Public Safety's policy of administering driver's license exams only
in English."' The Court found for the defendant, ruling that the
plaintiff had not established congressional intent to create a private
right of action. 142 In Alexander, the Court narrowed its implied private
right of action jurisprudence by limiting its search for Congress's in-
tent to the text and structure of the statute. 143 After Alexander; to en-
force a federal statute under an implied private right of action theory,
a court would have to find from its text and structure that Congress
intended to create both a private right and a private remedy.'" Be-
cause of this narrowing construction of implied private rights of ac-
tion, plaintiffs seeking to enforce statutory rights have increasingly
brought actions under § 1983. 145
B. The Rise and Fall of § 1983 as a Tool for Enforcing Federal Statutes
Congress enacted the predecessor of § 1983 in 1871 to protect the
civil rights of African-Americans in the South." 6 Section 1983 permits
U.S. citizens to bring suit against state action that deprives them of
"rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws
. ." 147 For over one hundred years, the Court permitted only plaintiffs
alleging violations of their constitutional rights to bring § 1983 law-
suits. 148 In 1980, however, in Maine u Thiboutot, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that plaintiffs deprived of welfare benefits to which they were enti-
tled under the federal Social Security Act could recover under
§ 1983.149 I n Thiboutot, a family with eight children brought a class ac-
tion lawsuit challenging Maine's interpretation of the Social Security
Act, which decreased their Aid to Families with Dependent Children
benefits. 15° In allowing recovery, the Court held that the § 1983 remedy
149 Id. at 293.
1 " Id. at 279.
142 See id. at 288-89, 293 (noting that statutes focusing on the party regulated rather titan.
the party protected create no private right of action, and finding none under this statute).
143 Sec id. at 288.
144 See 532 U.S. at 288, 293.
148 See Mank, supra note 120, at 1426-27.
146 See Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1. 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)); Mink. supra note 120, at 1427.
147 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See supra note 126 for additional text of § 1983.
148 See Man k, sepia note 120, at 1428.
149 Scc448 U.S. 1.3-4 (1980).
160 Id. at 2-3.
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applied to violations of federal statutes as well as constitutional law. 151
After Thiboutot, courts allowed private individuals who were
beneficiaries of federal statutory rights to bring suit under § 1983. 152
In 1981, in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Haldeman, the U.S.
Supreme Court found no enforceable private cause of action under
§ 6010 of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights
Act. 153
 In Pennhurst, a resident of a hospital for the care and treatment
of the mentally retarded' brought a class action lawsuit claiming that
her conditions of confinement violated the Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 15" The Court ruled that this Act did
not create individually enforceable rights. 155 The Court's holding lim-
ited the ability of beneficiaries of federal grant-in-aid programs to
bring a private cause of action against states that allegedly had vio-
lated conditions in their grants. 156
 In this case, then-justice William
Rehnquist characterized legislation enacted pursuant to the spending
power as similar to a con tract. 157 In return for a promise to comply
with specified conditions, states receive federal funds. 158 Like en-
forcement of a contract, which requires that the parties have accepted
its terms voluntarily and knowingly, enforcement of conditions against
a state requires that the slate has accepted the conditions voluntarily
and knowingly. 155
 Justice Rehnquist's opinion, in remanding the case
to the Third Circuit for consideration of § 1983, imposed a second
requirement that would have to be met before a beneficiary could use
§ 1983 to enforce conditions in a grant-in-aid statute against a state. 16°
Congress must "speak with a clear voice" and manifest an unambigu-
ous intent to create individually enforceable rights.ioi
In a line of cases from Pennhurst in 1981 to its 2002 decision in
Gonzaga University v. Doe, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified, and further
narrowed, its approach to determining which types of rights are en-
forceable under § 1983. 162 In 2002, in Gonzaga, the Court resolved a
1 " See id. at 4.
152 See id.; Mank, supra note 120, at 1430.
15s
	
451 U.S. at 31-32 (1981); Mank, supra note 120, at 1434.
154 451 U.S. at 6.
155
 See id. at 18.
156 See id. at 17-18.




Pen rihoi at, 451 U.S. at 17.
16° Sec id.
161 See id.
162 See, e.g.. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002); Blessing v. Freestone, 520
U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997).
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circuit split in holding that. the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act
("FERPA") does not establish individual rights enforceable under
§ 1983. 163 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that a
cause of action under § 1983 requires an unambiguously conferred
statutory right, not a vague benefit or interest.'" He emphasized that
previously, the Court had disallowed attempts to infer enforceable
rights from Spending Clause statutes. 165 He maintained that the issue of
congressional intent controls in both implied right of action and § 1983
cases. 166 Having established a restrictive test for enforceability of federal
statutes through § 1983, the Gonzaga Court found that FERPA does not.
establish individual rights. 167 The Court's focus on the absence of
rights-creating language, and the requirement, stated isn Alexander; that.
there be evidence in the statute of congressional intent to create both a
private right and a private remedy, resulted in the conflation of tests for
enforceability under implied private right of action and § 1983) 68
Plaintiffs recently tried to enforce NCLB under § 1983. 169 In June
of 2003, in Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. New
Yoe City Department of Education, the Federal District Court for the
Southern District of New York ruled that, by the standards articulated
in Gonzaga, plaintiffs cannot use § 1983 to enforce NCLB. 170 In Reform
Now, community organizations and parents brought a class action law-
suit charging that two local school districts and their superintendents
had violated NCLB's notice, transfer, and supplemental services provi-
sions."' The court in Reform Now stated that in Gonzaga, the U.S. Su-
preme Court determined that the first step of the inquiry for deciding
whether a statute creates an implied private right of action is the same
as the analysis for determining whether the statute is enforceable under
163 536 U.S. at 276, 278. This•decision limited use of § 1983 to instances where plain.
tiffs can demonstrate that there is clear and unambiguous evidence of Congress's intent to
establish individual rights on behalf of the plaintiff and those similarly situated. Sec Malik,
supra note 120, at 1421.
134 See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280.
to Id. at 281.
166 See id. at 283 (asserting that implied private right of action and § 1983 cases are not
distinct from each other).
167 See id. at 287.
168 See id. at 283, 284, 285-86; Alexander; 532 U.S. at 286; see also Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 297
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (indicating that the rights-creating language required by the Court
for § 1983 claim has previously been used only for implied private rights of action cases).
"9 See Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. New York City Dept of Educ., 269 F.
Stipp. 2d 338, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
170 Sce id. at 347.
171 See id. at 342.
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§ 1983. 172 Finding no explicit rights-creating language and no clear
and unambiguous congressional intent in NCLB to create individually
enforceable rights with respect to the notice, transfer, or supplemen-
tal educational service provisions of the Act, the court granted the
defendants' motion to dismiss. 173 In light of this decision, plaintiffs
seeking to enforce the provisions of NCLB may have to explore other
legal theories."4
C. The Evolution and Use of Third-Party Beneficiary Theory
The Court's characterization in 1981 in Pennhurst of legislation
enacted pursuant to Congress's spending power as similar to a contract
has important ramifications for beneficiaries who attempt to enforce
the conditions of these statutes. 175 The Court in Penul'''ts' slated that
Congress may establish conditions when it disburses federal money to
the states."6 As long as these conditions are clear so that states know
the consequences of their commitment, they may be bound by (heir
voluntary assent to comply with these terms, rather than forgo the
benefits of federal funding."7 The legitimacy of Congress's spending
power legislation, which imposes conditions on grants of federal
money, thus depends on whether the state assents voluntarily and
knowingly to the terms of the "contract." 178 Applying its reasoning to
the facts of the case, the Court held that the Disabled Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act does not impose such a binding obligation on the
states. 179 The Court found that the plain language of the statute em-
phasized a purpose to assist the states rather than to create new sub-
stantive rights. 180 It also found that because Congress did not appear to
grant sufficient money to defray the costs of the obligations imposed by
the statute, it must have had a limited purpose in enacting it. 181
172 Id. at 343.
172 See id. at 344, 347.
174 See infra notes 233-309 for further discussion of the application of legal theories
for private enforcement of NCLB.
175 See Pen nhurst, 451 U.S. at 17; Engdahl, supra note 122, at 71-72 (asserting that Penn-
hu rst's characterization of spending conditions as a contract has been affirmed).
176 451 U.S. at 17.
"7 See id.; see also Engdahl, supra note 122, at 78-79.
178 Pen nh u at, 451 U.S. at 17.
172 See id. at 18.
iao See id.
161 See id. at 24 (noting that when Congress imposes an affirmative obligation on the
states, it usually 'mikes a more substantial contribution to defray costs, and noting that for
. a state to be bound by the conditions imposed by a statute, its potential obligations may
not be indeterminate).
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In addition to establishing that the parties have entered into a
contract voluntarily and knowingly, plaintiffs must establish that they
have standing to enforce its terms. 182 Traditionally, only the parties to
a contract had the right to enforce it, but contract law has evolved to
provide a cause of action for third-party beneficiaries. 183 Because they
are not parties to the agreement, those benefited by conditions on
federal funding agreements must establish that they are third-party
beneficiaries in order to enforce the conditions.nu Under the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts, to establish standing as a third-party
beneficiary, a party must be an intended beneficiary. 185 The Second
Restatement's formulation provides that a party is an intended
beneficiary, and thus has rights under a contract, if
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and prom-
isee ... recognition of a right to performance in the
beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the
parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obliga-
tion of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends
to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised per-
formance. 186
This formulation has had far-reaching consequences for the devel-
opment of the third-party beneficiary rule because it has accommo-
dated beneficiaries of federal funding contracts. 187 Beginning with the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the recipient's compliance with a federal
statute has often been a condition for federal funding of public pro-
182 See Waters, supra note 127, at 1188.
no Sec Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, 275 (1859). Fox was the first case to hold that a
third party may enforce a contractual obligation made for the plaintiff's benefit.. See Wa-
ters, supra note 127, at 1115. Waters describes the third-party rule as a merger between
contract and quasi-contract. Sec id.
'84 Sec Waters, supra note 127, at 1176, 1187-88.
185 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1979).
188 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, SUPEa note 185, § 302 (also defining an in-
cidental beneficiary, who does not have rights under a contract, as "a beneficiary who is
not an intended beneficiary"). The Second Restatement modified the First Restatement's for-
mulation of the third-party beneficiary rule, which had defined "donee" and "creditor"
beneficiaries, and prohibited recovery under a contract by incidental beneficiaries—those
who were neither donee nor creditor beneficiaries. See id.; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CoN-
txnc is 133 (1932).
182
 See. Waters, supra note 127, at 1172, 1206-07 (characterizing accommodation of
these beneficiaries as consonant with the broad equitable principles informing the rule).
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grams. 198
 Because each statute defines the class that the program in-
tends to benefit, where federal funding calls for compliance with a
statute, the class of intended beneficiaries appears to be the same as
the intended beneficiaries of the contract.m This is so whether or not
they have a right to enforce the statute directly: 199
The Second Restatement contains a rule dealing with third-party
beneficiary claims based on government contracts) 91
 According to
subsection 313(1), the third-party beneficiary rule applies to contracts
with the government or government agencies, except where applying
the rule to such contracts is inconsistent with the policy of the law
creating the contract. 192 The comment to section 313 suggests that
this formulation "leaves room for the weighing of considerations pe-
culiar to particular situations:493 Subsection 313(2) provides that a
promisor who contracts with the government to render a public serv-
ice is protected from contractual liability to the general public for
consequential damages unless the terms of the promise provide for
such liability or a direct action is consistent with the terms of the con-
tract and the policy behind it. 194
 Illustrations of contracts between
promisors and the government include contracts to carry mail and to
maintain a certain water pressure at hydrants on city streets. 195 Despite
the existence of section 313 governing contracts with a government or
governmental agency, many courts allowing recovery by third-party
beneficiaries of public programs have not discussed 4. 196 This may be
because the comments and examples accompanying the text of sec-




191 See REsTA'rEstENT (SEcortn) OF CONTRACTS, supra DOW 185, § 313 (applying the
third-party beneficiary rule to contracts with a government or governmental agency). See
the text accompanying supra note 186 for the language of the third-party beneficiary rule.
192 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 185, § 313(1).
196 Id. § 313 cult. a.
194 See id. § 313 (2).
199 See id. § 313 cmt. a, illus. 1-2. Beneficiaries of these types of contracts frequently seek
to recover damages for harm caused by their reliance on a promise. Waters, supra note 127,
at 1198-99, 1201-05; see also H.R. Mach Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 897-98
(N.Y 1928) (concluding that in a lawsuit brought by resident of City of Rennselaer against
owner of company that had promised to supply water to fire hydrants at a specified pres-
sure. plaintiff was not an intended beneficiary, in part because use of the third-party
beneficiary doctrine in this context could have imposed a crushing financial burden).
196 See Waters, supra note 127, at 1201.
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cial contracts with the government.'" Benefits conferred on third
parties by statutory schemes, in contrast, are outside of the commer-
cial realm. 19°
Third-party beneficiary claims have succeeded in the courts to
enforce conditions of federal funding statutes. 199 In 1967, in Bossier
Parish School Board v. Lemon, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals invoked
third-party beneficiary theory to hold a school board accountable for
a promise it had made in exchange for federal funding. 200 The court
held that where a school board had made assurances under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 that it would admit both African American and
white children on equal terms to schools for children of military base
personnel, these assurances constituted a contractual agreement. 201
By agreeing to abide by the terms of the Civil Rights Act, the defen-
dants had assured these children rights as third-party beneficiaries. 202
By accepting the contract and the federal funds it brought, the school
board was thus estopped from denying the plaintiffs, African-
American children, attendance at these schools." 3
In 1977, in Fuzie v. Manor Care, Inc., the Federal District. Court for
the Northern District of Ohio denied the defendant's motion to dis-
miss the plaintiff's third-party beneficiary claim under the Medicaid
Act.204 The plaintiff, a Medicaid recipient living at. a private nursing
home operated by the defendant, brought suit to enforce the provi-
sions of Medicaid regulations. 203 Although she could invoke neither
an implied private right of action nor § 1983 to enforce her rights, as
a Medicaid recipient, she was nevertheless a third-party beneficiary of
the statute. 20°
107 See RESTATEMI•NT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 185. 8 313; Waters, supra
note 127, at 1201.
195 See Waters, supra note 127, at 1201-02, 1204-05.
109 See Bossier Parish, 370 F.2d at 852; Fuzie v. Manor Care, Inc., 461 F. Stipp. 689, 697,
701 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
200 Sce370 F.2(1 at 850.
201 Sec id,
202 See id. (characterizing acceptance of funds as further ratification of the contract)•
209 See id.; see also Waters, supra note 127, at 1184 (characterizing Bossier Parish as an
early civil rights case that vindicated both statutory and constitutional rights through the
use of the third-party beneficiary rule).
204 See 461 F. Stipp. at 701.
205 Id. at 691.
206 See id. at 697, 701. Waters asserts that third party beneficiary claims are equivalent
to the first prong of the Cort test that the Court uses in evaluating implied private right of
action claims. See Waters, supra note 127, at 1174. Unlike a private right of action plaintiff,
a third-party beneficiary claimant need only establish membership in the class for whose
special benefit Congress enacted the federal statute. Id.
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In the past, when plaintiffs brought lawsuits alleging both im-
plied private rights of action and third-party beneficiary contract
claims, courts did not often reach the latter because they allowed re-
covery tinder the former.2" In evaluating claims under implied pri-
vate right and § 1983 causes of action, the U.S. Supreme Court has
indicated frequently that plaintiffs are intended beneficiaries of statu-
tory schemes 208 In 1990, in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n, the Court
determined that plaintiff hospitals had a private right of action to en-
force benefits conferred by the Medicaid program. 209 In its holding,
the Court noted that healthcare providers are undoubtedly intended .
beneficiaries of the Boren Amendment because it is phrased in terms
of benefiting them. 210
In 1997, in Blessing v. Freestone, the Court determined that custo-
dial mothers do not have an enforceable right under § 1983 to have
the state's program achieve "substantial compliance" with the re-
quirements of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act 2 11
 In its decision,
the Court left open the possibility that some provisions of Title IV-D
might give rise to individual rights. 212 It found only that the plaintiffs
had not articulated—and lower courts had not evaluated—a well-
defined right.213 Although the Court did not address explicitly a third-
party beneficiary contract claim in Wilder or in Blessing, its language
may provide guidance for plaintiffs seeking to bring such claims as
beneficiaries of public programs.214
207 See Waters, supra note 127, at 1181.
2°11 See, e.g., Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Assn, 496 U.S. 498, 510 (1990); Golden State Transit
Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 104, 109 (1989) (finding that applicant for re-
newal of taxicab franchise was intended beneficiary of statutory scheme under National
Labor Relations Act).
209 See Warfel; 496 U.S. at 510.
219 See id. The Court also noted that (1) Medicaid is a voluntary program in which
states may choose to participate; (2) Congress enacted the Medicaid Act in 1965 and
passed the Boren Amendment in response to problems it perceived; and (3) there is a
right enforceable by healthcare providers under § 1983. See id. at 502,505-06,509.
211 See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 332-33.
212 Sec id. at 345. Cf. Wright v. Roanoke Redev. & Hons. Auth.. 479 U.S. 418, 419, 421-
22, 430 (1987) (holding that tenants of public housing projects had a right to have utility
costs included within a rental payment capped by federal housing legislation).
213 Sec Blessing, 520 U.S. at 342-43.
214 See id. at 345; Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509-10.
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IV. THE IMPACT OF No CHILD LEFT BEHIND ON EDUCATIONAL EQUITY
This Part of the Note explores the various ways in which NCLB
holds promise for advocates of educational equity.21s First, section IV.A
discusses the use of NCLB to strengthen existing constitutional and
common-law causes of action. 21 ° Second, section IV.B analyzes the vi-
ability of various tools for enforceinent of NCLB.217 Subsections IV.B.1
and IV.B.2 suggest that it is unlikely that a court will allow beneficiaries
of NCLB to enforce the Act under an implied private right of action or
a § 1983 theory.218 Finally, subsection IV.B.3 argues that third-party
beneficiary theory is the most promising tool for enforcement of NCLB
and lays out the framework required to bring such a claim. 219
A. Using No Child Left Behind to Strengthen. Existing Causes of Action
Plaintiffs may be able to use NCLB to fill in the gaps that have pre-
vented their constitutional and common-law claims from succeeding
thus far. 22° For example, the NCLB requirement that all students in all
schools meet proficiency on state assessments by 2014 may strengthen
constitutional claims premised on state guarantees of adequate educa-
tion.221 States must determine whether schools are making adequate
yearly progress ("AYP") toward this goal, and identify schools failing to
do so. 222 Such identification strengthens claims by students attending
these schools that they are being deprived of an adequate education. 223
Educational malpractice plaintiffs may be able to overcome courts' re-
sistance to find a duty of care owed to students by focusing on the re-
quirements NCLB imposes on districts and states. 224 Courts could rely
on the standards established by NCLB, as well as the statute's focus on
215 See infra. notes 221-225,259-309, and accompanying text for further discussion of
the ways in which NCLB may improve education.
216 See infra notes 220-225 and accompanying text.
217 Sec infra notes 226-309 and accompanying text.
219 See infra notes 233-257 and accompanying text.
219 See infra notes 258-309 and accompanying text.
229 See infra notes 221-225 and accompanying text.
221 See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b) (2) (F) (2002). See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying
text for discussion of constitutional claims.
222 Seen U.S.C. § 6316(b) (1)(A).
223 See id. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text for discussion of constitutional
claims. A detailed exploration of this theory is beyond the scope of this Note.
224 See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of educational mal.
practice claims and supra notes 66-85 for a discussion of the relevant provisions of NCLB.
One provision that establishes school districts' duty to students is the requirement that
schools provide activities to assist students experiencing difficulty in mastering academic
achievement standards. See 20 U.S.C. § 6314 (b) (1) (1).
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accountability, to overcome public policy objections to imposing liabil-
ity on schools that fail to improve. 225
B. Enforcing No Child Left Behind to Improve Education
NCLB contains several important provisions to improve educa-
tional opportunity for at-risk students. 226 The Act reflects the Bush
Administration's attempt to hold all school districts and states to high
standards. 227 The federal government, however, has not enforced
NCLB adequately in the two years since its enactment. 228 Schools that
have not met NCLB targets, such as AYP, are not providing the serv-
ices, such as transfer options and supplemental services, that the Act
mandates. 229
 States have failed to meet U.S. Department of Education
deadlines for submitting lists of underperforming schools. 239
 Because
the federal government has not yet penalized a state for failing to
meet NCLB requirements, advocates for educational equity must pre-
pare for the eventuality that the government will continue not to en-
force the Act. 231
 To ensure that its intended beneficiaries actually
benefit from NCLB, it is important to explore the merits of pursuing
private enforcement under each of the theories discussed above as an
alternative to federal enforcementP 2
1. Attempts to Enforce NCLB Under Implied Private Right of Action
Theory Will Not Succeed
Under Cod v. Ash and its progeny, the U.S. Supreme Court looks
for significant evidence that Congress intended to create a private right
of action to determine whether a private remedy is implicit in a stat-
222 See supra notes 52-97 for discussion of NCLB and the policies informing the Act.
See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text for discussion of policy reasons cited by
courts denying recovery for educational malpractice.
226
 See, e.g.. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311(h)(2)(E)—(H), 6311(b)(3)(C), 6314(b)(1)(I),
6316(b) (1) (E). See supra notes 66-85 and accompanying text for further discussion of
NCLB's provisions.
227 See 20 U.S.C. § 6301; Statement, supra note 52, at 1615. See supra notes 52. 63-97
and accompanying text for further discussion of the goals of NCLB.
229 See Leonard, supra note 113, at A3; Olson, supra note 113, at 1; Toch supra note 95,
at 15.
229 See Gewertz, supra note 113, at 1; Leonard, supra note 113, at A3.
239
 See Olson, supra note 113, at 1.
231 See id.; Toch, supra note 95, at 15.
232 See Olson, supra note 113, at 1.
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ute. 253 In 2001, in Alexander v. Sandoval, the Court limited its search for
Congress's intent to the text and structure of the statute. 234 To enforce
NCLB under an implied private right of action theory, therefore, a
court would have to find from a statute's text and structure that Con-
gress intended to create both a private right and a private remedy. 235
NCLB provides options for parents of children attending persis-
tently failing schools. 236 They may, for example, transfer their children
out of these schools or opt for free supplemental services. 237 These
and other provisions may be seen as creating rights or benefits, but it
is unlikely that a court would find that the text and structure of NCLB
demonstrate a congressional intent to create a private remedy. 238
Alexandra; the Court stated that Congress has not demonstrated an
intent to create a private remedy where a statute's language is di-
rected to the federal agencies distributing federal funds, and the stat-
ute empowers agencies to enforce their regulations by terminating
handing.239 Under this test, NCLB fails to demonstrate a congressional
intent to create a private remedy. 24° In the wake of Alexander; advo-
cates for educational equity would not be able to enforce the benefits
conferred by NCLB under an implied right of action theory."'
2. Attempts to Enforce NCLB Under § 1983 Will Not Succeed
Between 1980 and 2002, a number of plaintiffs used § 1983 suc-
cessfully to enforce benefits conferred by statutes. 2't2 The U.S. Supreme
2" See 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); see, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Atith. v. Nail Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13, 14 (1981); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v, Halderman,
451 U.S. 1, 18 (1981). See supra notes 128-145 and accompanying text for further discus-
sion of implied private right of action.
234 See 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001),
233SCC Transarnerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979), See supra
notes 128-145 and accompanying text for further discussion of implied private right of
action analysis.
tae See, e.g.. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(0 (1) (E), (b) (6), (e) (2002).
237 See, e.g., Ed. § 6316(b) (1) (E). (b) (8)—(10), (e). See supra notes 67-85 and accompa-
nying text for additional provisions of NCLB that may be interpreted as providing rights to
children and their parents.
na See, e.g., Alexander. 532 U.S. at 286, 293; Sca Claimers, 453 U.S. at 13, 14; Penni:nut,
451 U.S. at 18.
239 See 532 U.S. at 289.
249
 &c id.
24t See id. at 288-89. See infra notes 242-257 and accompanying text for further discus-
sion of NCLB's failure to meet Alexander's narrow test as adopted in Gonzaga University v.
Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 286 (2002).
242 See, e.g., Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 524 (1990); Maine V. Thiboutot,
448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980). See supra notes 149-162 and accompanying text for discussion of the
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Court's 2002 decision in Gonzaga University v. Doe, however, made recov-
ery under § 1983 more difficult. 243
 The Court. itn Gouzaga focused on
rights-creating language and required that there be evidence in the
statute of congressional intent to create both a private right and a pri-
vate remedy. 244
 In doing so, the Gonzaga decision conflated the tests for
enforceability under implied right of action and § 1983.245
It is unlikely that a § 1983 action to enforce NCLB would succeed
under the Court's current analytical framework, as refined in Gon-
zaga.246
 One court has already ruled that NCLB is not enforceable
under § 1983.247 In 2003, in Association of Community Organizations for
Reform Now v. New York City Department of Education, the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of New York granted the defendants'
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' § 1983 claim.248 Utilizing the Gonzaga
standard, the court found that NCLB contains no explicit rights-
creating language and no clear and unambiguous congressional in-
tent to create individually enforceable rights. 249
 Reform Now addressed
the notice, transfer, and supplemental educational service provisions
of NCLB. 25° The court did not discuss NCLB's legislative history, but
instead based its decision on the text and structure of the Act. 2" This
Court's use of this theory. During this time, NCLB plaintiffs probably would have been
able to meet the Court's § 1983 test by showing that Congress intended that specific NCLB
provisions benefit them, that their right was neither too vague nor too amorphous to be
judicially enforceable, and that the statute unambiguously imposed a binding obligation
on the states. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329,340-41 (1997).
243 See 536 U.S. at 286. See supra notes 163-168 and accompanying text, and infra notes
244-257 and accompanying text, for further discussion of this case and its impact on
§ 1983 jurisprudence.
249
	 536 U.S. at 283,284,286.
243 See id. at 297 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
246 See id. at 286; A.55 .11 of Crnty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. New York City Dept of Ethic.,
269 F. Supp. 2d 338,347 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). See supra notes 162-168 for further discussion of
the Court's narrowing interpretation of § 1983.
247 Reform Now, 269 F. Stipp. 2d at 347.
248
 See id.
245 See id. at 343,347 (stating that after Gouzaga, the first step of the inquiry for decid-
ing whether a statute creates an implied private right of action is the same as the analysis
for determining whether the statute is enforceable through § 1983).
2" See id. at 342. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text for further discussion
of these provisions.
231 See Reform Now, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 347. The Court in Gonzaga stated that the focus of
the inquiry is whether Congress intended to confer individual rights upon a class of
beneficiaries. 536 U.S. at 285-86. After citing several cases, and without explicitly holding
that the § 1983 inquiry necessarily is confined to the text and structure of a statute, the
Court indicated that where the text and structure of a statute do not demonstrate that
Congress intends to create new individual rights, there is no basis for a private sin( under
implied private right of action or § 1983. See id.
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approach is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Alex-
ande• that a court must limit its search for congressional intent to the
text and structure of a statute.252 Therefore, it is unlikely that future
plaintiffs would be able to rely on the legislative history of NCLB for
evidence of clear and unambiguous congressional intent to create in-
dividually enforceable rights. 253
Like Alexander; Gouzaga harms the intended beneficiaries of fed-
eral grant-in-aid programs, 254 By demanding proof of Congress's in-
tent to provide both a right and a remedy to individuals, and by focus-
ing narrowly on the text and structure of the statute as evidence of
intent, the U.S. Supreme Court has made it difficult to succeed in an
implied private cause of action. 255 Gonzaga's requirement that plain-
tiffs demonstrate congressional intent to create both a right and a
remedy similarly limits the potential for success of intended
beneficiaries of statutes suing under § 1983. 256 NCLB plaintiffs will
have to look to other legal theories to ensure that they receive the
benefits conferred by the statute. 257
3. Plaintiffs Should Seek to Enforce NCLB Under Third-Party
Beneficiary Theory
The most promising theory of enforcement for NCLB is third-
party beneficiary theory. 258 To recover under this theory, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that a contract exists between the parties and that
the promisee intended that the contract benefit the plain tiff. 259 Where,
as here, one party to the contract is a government, the plaintiff also
must establish that allowing recovery would not contravene the policy
of the law authorizing the contract. 260
262 See 532 U.S. at 288.
263 See id. See supra notes 86-107 for a discussion of NCLB's legislative history.
264 See Gonzagn, 536 U.S. at 286; Alexander, 532 U.S. at 288; Malik, supra note 120, at 1480.
233 See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 288; Reform Now, 269 F. Stipp. 2d at 343, 347; Mack, supra
note 120, at 1481.
256 See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 286; Reform Now, 269 F. Stipp. 2d at 343, 347; ?dank, supra
note 120, at 1481.
237 See supra notes 233-256 for further discussion of the likely failure of both private
right of action and § 1983 as theories of enforcement.
266 See infra notes 259-309 and accompanying text.
239 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACIS, supra note 185, § 302. See supra notes
183-214 and accompanying text for further discussion of this theory and its application to
federal funding contracts.
266 See RE.STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 185. § 313.
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a. Establishing the Existence of a Contract
To argue that this theory applies to a statute that Congress passed
tinder its spending power, plaintiffs should emphasize the words of the
U.S. Supreme Court in the 1981 case, Pennburst State School & Hospital v.
Halde•man.261 Li Pennhurst, then-Justice Rehnquist stated that legislation
enacted pursuant to Congress's spending power is similar to a con-
tract.262 Like the terms of a contract, conditions imposed by acceptance
of federal funding will only bind a state if it accepts them voluntarily
and knowingly. 263 Pennhurst, the Court held that the terms of the
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act do not. meet this test. 264 The
statute's plain language emphasizes a purpose to assist the states, rather
than the disabled, and Congress did not appear to grant sufficient
money to defray the costs of imposing a significant obligation on the
states. 265 The terms of the statute could not bind the states because the
states were unaware of the scope of their obligations. 266
The plain language of NCLB, unlike that of the statute in Penn-
hunt, states a purpose to provide benefits in that it aims to ensure edu-
cational opportunity for all children. 267 The terms of NCLB specify, in
detail, the obligations that states must assume in exchange for federal
funding.268 Although some opponents of NCLB argue that Congress
has not funded the statute at levels to enable the states to meet all of
the obligations imposed by the statute, others, including the President,
have proclaimed publicly that sufficient federal dollars are attached to
NCLB's mandates. 269 Furthermore, when Congress passed NCLB and
states agreed to its conditions in exchange for federal funding, they
See 451 U.S. at 17.
262 Sec id.
269 Sec id.; ,see also Engdahl, supra note 122, at 78.
264 See 451 U.S. at 17-18.
266
 See id. at 17-18, 24.
266 Sec id. See supra note 181 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
Court's decision in Pennhurst regarding requirements that statutory conditions must meet
in order to hind a state.
267 Compare 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2002), with Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 18. See supra notes 63-
65, 86-89 and accompanying text for further discussion of NCLB's purpose clause.
2'8 See, e.g.. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311(b)(3)(A)—(C), 6311(b)(2)(E)—(H), 6316. See supra
notes 66-85 and accompanying text for further discussion of NCLB's provisions.
269 Compare 149 CONG. Mc. 1-13766 (daily ed. May 8, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Etheridge), and NEA, supra note 102 (asserting that the bill is continually being under-
funded), with H.R. REP. No. 107-063, supra note 91, at 1242, and SPENDING, supra note 97
(asserting that NCLB is adequately funded and represents a significant increase in federal
funding of education reform).
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were well aware of the obligations the Act imposes. 270 For examPle,
provisions of the Act such as the requirement that schools make ade-
quate yearly progress, and the obligation to provide parents of students
at schools that have failed to do so with notice and the option to trans-
fer or to receive supplemental services, are stated in clear language."'
These provisions do not pose an indeterminate obligation on a school
that fails to make adequate yearly progress nor a state, which must en-
sure that the school complies. 272 NCLB appears to meet the guidelines
imposed by the Pennhurst Court.273 The Court in Pennhurst, however,
did not address a third-party beneficiary claim directly. 274
b. Establishing Standing
. In addition to meeting the Pennhurst guidelines, to enforce a fed-
eral funding agreement under a third-party beneficiary theory, plain-
tiffs must establish standing as third-party beneficiaries. 275 Under the
Second Restatement, in order to establish standing, third-party
beneficiaries must be intended beneficiaries, that is, the funding pro-
gram must be intended to benefit them. 276 Plaintiffs seeking to recover
as third-party beneficiaries of a contract with the government must also
demonstrate that application of the third-party beneficiary rule does
not contravene the policy of the law authorizing the contract, as pro-
vided by section 313 of the Second Restatement of Contracts. 277 It has been
suggested that section 313 applies only to commercial claims because it
specifically mentions consequential damages, rather than injunctions,
and because its illustrations all refer to commercial contracts. 278
Beneficiaries of commercial contracts frequently seek to recover clam-
270 See supra notes 66-85 and accompanying text for evidence that NCLB describes. in
detail, the obligations of states tinder the Act.
271 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 6316(13) (1) (E), (b) (6). (b) (8) (ii), (e). See supra notes 76-79
and accompanying text for further discussion of these provisions.
272 See 20. U.S.C. § 6316(b) (1) (E), (b) (6), (b) (8) (ii), (e). See supra notes 76-79 and
accompanying text for further discussion of these provisions.
273 See 451 U.S. at 17-18. See supra notes 176-181 and accompanying text for further
discussion of the Pennhurst guidelines.
274 See 451 U.S. at 17-18,32.
276 See Waters, supra note 127, at 1176,1187-88.
276 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or CONTRACIN., supra note 185, § 302. Sec supra note
186 and accompanying text for further discussion of the Second Restatement's intended
beneficiary formulation.
277 Sec RESTA'EEMENT (SECOND) or CON'ERACTS, supra note 185, § 313(1).
273 See id. § 313; Waters, supra note 127, at 1201.
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ages based on harm caused by their reliance on a promise. 279
 The rem-
edy sought in cases involving beneficiaries of public programs, in com-
parison, seeks to achieve the objective of the statute through an injunc-
tion, frequently resembling specific performance. 28° In contrast to
potential claims by members of the general public in the commercial
context, statutes define an identifiable group for whose benefit the fed-
eral government has imposed an obligation on the defendant. 281
Because it does not contravene the policy behind a statute con-
ferring benefits upon a particular group to permit members of that
group to seek enforcement of the statute, section 313 does not pre-
clude application of the third-party beneficiary rule to public pro-
grams established by a contract with the government. 282 Furthermore,
this use of the third-party beneficiary rule is consonant with broad,
equitable principles allowing recovery by individuals who were not
parties to the contract, but for whose benefit the contract was en-
acted. 283 Where defendants receive federal funds intended to be used
for plaintiffs' benefit but fail to provide the intended benefits, the
third- party beneficiary rule should be invoked to prohibit unjust en-
richment.284 Unlike implied private right of action theory, which lim-
its consideration of intent to benefit to the text and structure of a
statute, third-party beneficiary theory is consistent with a broader
reading of statutory intent. 285 From its origins, as demonstrated by its
focus on the party intended to benefit. from a contract, this theory is
premised on equitable principles and aims to prohibit unjust enrich-
men t.286 Consistent with this purpose, a court would be able to look to
a statute's legislative history to determine congressional in ten t. 287
279 See Waters, supra note 127, at 1204-05; see also H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water
Co., 159 N.E. 896,899 (N.Y 1928).
288 See Waters. supra note 127, at 1204-05.
281 See RESTXFEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 185, § 313; Waters, supra
note 127, at 1204-05.
282 See RrsTATE:mErkfT (SECOND) OF CONTRACIS, DIM note 185, § 313; Waters, supra
note 127, at 1204-05,




286 Sce id. (discussing Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859 ))•
287 See id.
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c. Establishing In 	 to Benefit  a Particular Class
The legislative history of NCLB reveals that. its purpose is to im-
prove educational opportunity for all children. 258 NCLB aims to target
funds to needy communities. 289 It aims to inform parents about the
quality of their local schools as well as about their options to transfer
their children out of failing schools or to receive supplemental serv-
ices. 29° NCLB requires that parents be involved in a meaningful way in
planning and implementing all programs assisted by the Act. 291 Under
NCLB, schools must identify and assist struggling students. 292 The text
and legislative history of the statute reveal that. NCLB confers these
benefits—and others—upon students and their parents, consistent
with the broader purpose of the statute to improve educational op-
portunity for the neediest students. 295
Although the Federal District Court for the Southern District of
New York in Reform Now found that the text and structure of NCLB
did not evince congressional intent to create individually enforceable
rights, a court evaluating a third-party beneficiary claim would not be
limited, as was the Reform Now court, by the U.S. Supreme Court's
§ 1983 jurisprudence. 294 Third-party beneficiary theory aims to effec-
tuate the intentions of the parties. 295 Inquiry into parties' intentions is
not limited to the text and structure of the agreement, but rather fo-
cuses on what the circumstances indicate about the promisee's linen-
tions.296 The legislative history of NCLB would assist a court in deter-
mining that the federal government intended that the neediest.
students benefit from NCLB. 297
288 See 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2002); 149 CONG. Rec. S194 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 2003) (state-
ment of Sen. Gregg); Press Release, supra note 87.
294 See 20 U.S.C. § 6301; Payne, supra note 88, at 315-16.
29° See 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b) (1) (E), (b) (6), (b) (8) (ii); Payne, supra note 88. at 321;
lioniNnt GREGG, supra note 94, at 6.
291 See 20 U.S.C. § 6318(a) (2)—(d); see also Payne, supra note 88, at 322; Ittnanoat &
GREGG. supra note 94, at 6.
20 U.S.C. § 6314(b)(1)(1).
293 Sec. e.g., id. §§6301, 6314 (b)(1)(I), 6316(b)(1)(E). 6316(b)(6), 6316(b)(11),
6316(b) (8) (ii), 6316(e). See supra notes 6347 and accompanying text for further discus.
sion of NCLB's purpose.
294 See 269 F. Stipp. 2d at 344.
296 See RESTATENIENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS. supra Hole 185, § 302.
296 See id.
297 See supra notes 63-65, 86-97 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
ways in which the White House and members of Congress have characterized the purposes
of NCLB. The Second Restatement of Contracts provides that a party is an intended
beneficiary, and can therefore recover as a third-party beneficiary, if recognition of the
beneficiary's right to performance is appropriate to effectuate the parties' intention and
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Once a court establishes that the parties to the agreement in-
tended to give a particular class of people the benefit of the agree-
ment, ihe inquiry need go no further. 298 It would be easier for the
beneficiaries of NCLII—disadvantaged children and their parents—to
recover under this theory than under implied private right of action
or § 1983. 2" Not much case law exists to guide plaintiffs or courts, as
third-party beneficiary theory remains largely untested as a theory of
recovery for the beneficiaries of statutory schemes.") This is largely
because, where plaintiffs have included contract claims, courts often
have allowed recovery under implied private rights of action and,
hence, have not reached the contract claims."'
d. Drawing on Precedent
Two cases that courts decided before plaintiffs first succeeded in
using § 1983 to enforce statutory rights suggest that beneficiaries of
conditions on federal funding may use third-party beneficiary theory
to ensure that they receive promised benefits. 302 In 1967, in Bossier
Parish School Board v. Lemon, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held a
school board accountable for providing African-American children
with the benefits it had assured them by accepting funds under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 3" In 1977, in Fuzie v. Manor Care, Inc., the
Federal District Court for the Northern District of Ohio ruled that a
plaintiff who could invoke neither implied private right of action nor
§ 1983 to enforce her rights under the Medicaid Act was nevertheless
a third-party beneficiary of the statute. 3" Furthermore, even where
courts have not addressed third-party beneficiary claims directly, dicta
circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the
promised performance. See RES • A• EAIEN• (SECOND) or CON'IRACTS, supra note 185, § 302.
298 See Waters, supra note 127, at 1174. See supra note 206 and accompanying text for
discussion of Waters's assertion that a third-party beneficiary claimant need only establish
membership in the class for whose special benefit Congress enacted the federal statute.
290 Compare supra note 185 and accompanying text (outlining requirements of third-
party beneficiary standing), with supra notes 137-144 (outlining current requirements of
implied primte right of action), and supra notes 166-168 (discussing current requirements
of § 1983).3°° See Waters, supra note 127, at 1181.
301 See id.
302 See flossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 850 (5th Cir. 1967); Fuzie v.
Manor Care, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 689, 701 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
31" Sec 370 F.2d at 850.
S" See 461 F. Supp. at 701.
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in some cases suggest that courts might consider this theory to vindi-
cate rights that are well defined, such as those in NCLB. 305
Plaintiffs seeking to enforce NCLB to receive the benefits that
the Act confers upon them can build upon precedent to bring third-
party beneficiary claims to court.306 They can rely on earlier cases that
address third-party beneficiary claims directly, such as Bossier Pafish
and Fuzie.3" They can rely also on cases that address elements of
third-party beneficiary claims in decisions based on implied private
right of action or § 1983.308 Given the broad purpose of third-party
beneficiary theory, which is informed by equitable principles and
aims to prohibit unjust enrichment, this theory holds promise for
plaintiffs seeking to enforce NCLB to promote educational equity.3°9
CONCLUSION
Fifty years after Brown v Board of Education, poor and minority chil-
dren still are deprived of educational opportunity. Years of both litiga-
tion and legislation have not accomplished educational equity. The pas-
sage of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 holds promise in that it
provides important benefits for children. Thus far, however, the federal
government has not acted adequately to enforce NCLB. Schools and
states that fail to make adequate yearly progress continue to receive
money tinder NCLB, but they fail to meet the obligations to children
and parents that the Act imposes. To protect the benefits NCLB confers
upon them, it is essential that parents of children attending these fail-
ing schools explore their options for private enforcement. Given the
U.S. Supreme Court's decisions within the past three years narrowing
implied private right of action and § 1983, neither will be available to
plaintiffs pursuing educational adequacy'. The most promising theory
for enforcement of NCLB is third-party beneficiary theory.
To succeed in enforcing NCLB under a third-party beneficiary
theory, plaintiffs should focus on similarities between federal funding
agreements and contracts, the text and legislative history of NCLB
305 Sec Blessing; 520 U.S. at 345 (declining to foreclose the possibility that a well-defined
right might be enforceable); Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 (characterizing funding agreements
as similar to contracts and specifying requirements they must meet to bind states).
306 See Bossier Parish. 370 F.2d at 852; Fuzie. 461 F. Stipp. at 701.
307 See Bossier Parish, 370 F.2d at 850; Fuzie, 461 F. Stipp. at 701.
308 See, e.g., Blessing, 520 U.S. at 345; Wilder; 496 U.S. at. 502, 509-510; Pertnhu rst, 451
U.S. at 17.
30g Sce 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2002); ItEsTA-rt:m ENT (Sr.coNn) OF CON'n2ACirei, SUPM note
185, § 302; Waters, supra note 127, at 1206-07.
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that demonstrate an intent to benefit children by providing them with
opportunities to obtain a high-quality education, and the equitable
principles informing third-party beneficiary theory. Advocates for
educational equity must prepare to challenge states to provide the
quality education for all students that they agreed to when they began
accepting NCLB funds two years ago.
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